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Abstract—Modern computer systems are becoming faster,
more efficient, and increasingly interconnected with each gen-
eration. Consequently, these platforms also grow more complex,
with continuously new features introducing the possibility of new
bugs. Hence, the semiconductor industry employs a combination
of different verification techniques to ensure the security of
System-on-Chip (SoC) designs during the development life cycle.
However, a growing number of increasingly sophisticated attacks
are starting to leverage cross-layer bugs by exploiting subtle inter-
actions between hardware and software, as recently demonstrated
through a series of real-world exploits with significant security
impact that affected all major hardware vendors.
In this paper, we take a deep dive into microarchitectural
security from a hardware designer’s perspective by reviewing the
existing approaches to detect hardware vulnerabilities during the
design phase. We show that a protection gap currently exists in
practice that leaves chip designs vulnerable to software-based
attacks. In particular, existing verification approaches fail to
detect specific classes of vulnerabilities, which we call HardFails:
these bugs evade detection by current verification techniques
while being exploitable from software. We demonstrate such
vulnerabilities in real-world SoCs using RISC-V to showcase and
analyze concrete instantiations of HardFails. Patching these hard-
ware bugs may not always be possible and can potentially result
in a product recall. We base our findings on two extensive case
studies: the recent Hack@DAC 2018 hardware security competi-
tion, where 54 independent teams of researchers competed world-
wide over a period of 12 weeks to catch inserted security bugs
in SoC RTL designs, and an in-depth systematic evaluation of
state-of-the-art verification approaches. Our findings indicate that
even combinations of techniques will miss high-impact bugs due
to the large number of modules with complex interdependencies
and fundamental limitations of current detection approaches. We
also craft a real-world software attack that exploits one of the
RTL bugs from Hack@DAC that evaded detection and discuss
novel approaches to mitigate the growing problem of cross-layer
bugs at design time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The divide between hardware and software security re-
search is starting to take its toll, as we are witnessing in-
creasingly sophisticated attacks that are combining software
and hardware bugs to exploit computing platforms at run-
time [31, 34, 50, 56, 60, 82, 89, 96, 99]. These cross-
layer attacks disrupt traditional threat models which assume
either hardware or software adversaries. For instance, attacks
may provoke physical effects to induce hardware faults or
deliberately trigger transient microarchitectural states. Such
attacks make the resulting failure modes visible to software
adversaries enabling them to exploit hardware vulnerabilities
remotely. The affected targets range from low-end embedded
devices to complex servers, that are hardened with architectural
defenses such as data-execution prevention, supervisor-mode
execution prevention, and advanced defenses such as control-
flow integrity.
Hardware vulnerabilities. Existing security mechanisms are
completely circumvented [31, 34, 56, 60, 82, 89, 96, 99] by
cross-layer attacks due to the exclusive focus on mitigating at-
tacks that exploit software vulnerabilities. Moreover, hardware-
security extensions such as Sanctum [26], Intel SGX [43],
and ARM TrustZone [5] are not designed to tackle hardware
vulnerabilities. Their implementation remains vulnerable to
potentially undetected hardware bugs committed at design-
time, and in fact, SGX and TrustZone have been targets
of successful cross-layer attacks [89, 96]. While Sanctum’s
formal model offers provable security guarantees, its trusted
abstract platform model is formulated at a high level of
abstraction. This approach does not ensure security at the
hardware implementation level [87]. Hardware vulnerabilities
can be introduced due to: (a) incorrect or ambiguous security
specifications, (b) incorrect design, (c) faulty implementation
of the design, or (d) a combination thereof. Implementation
bugs occur through human error or imperfections in the high-
level translation and gate-level synthesis throughout several
stages of the integrated circuit (IC) design flow. IC design
is typically implemented at the register-transfer level (RTL)
by hardware designers using hardware description languages
(HDLs) such as Verilog and VHDL, which is synthesized
into a lower-level representation using compilers and auto-
mated tools. Just like software programmers introducing bugs
to the high-level code, hardware engineers may accidentally
introduce bugs to the RTL described in this high-level HDL.
Software errors typically cause programs to crash, triggering
various fallback routines to ensure the safety and security of
all other programs running on the platform. However, no such
safety net exists for hardware bugs. Therefore, even minor
glitches in the implementation of, e.g., a hardware subsystem
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within the processor may cause the entire platform to break
down completely.1
Detecting hardware security bugs. To detect such bugs,
the semiconductor industry makes extensive use of a variety
of verification and analysis techniques, such as simulation
and emulation (also called dynamic verification) as well as
formal verification through a wide range of tools. Examples for
such industry-standard tools include Incisive [15], Solidify [8],
Questa Simulation and Questa Formal [59], OneSpin 360 [85],
and JasperGold [16]. Originally, the predecessors of these
tools were designed for functional verification, with security-
relevant verification features being incorporated much later.
Additionally, while a rich body of knowledge exists within the
software community, e.g., regarding software exploitation, and
techniques to automatically detect software vulnerabilities [27,
30, 49, 52, 61, 84, 95], widely applicable tools for analyzing
HDLs are currently lagging behind [48, 72, 94]. Consequently,
the industry has moved towards a security development cycle
for hardware technologies—inspired by the security develop-
ment lifecycle [36] for software and in line with the guidelines
provided for hardware security development lifecycle [88].
This process incorporates a combination of many different
techniques and toolsets such as RTL manual code audits,
assertion-based testing, dynamic simulation, and automated
security verification. Although many functional bugs have been
slipping through this process already in the past [12, 25], it was
widely believed that vulnerabilities with a severe impact on
security can be prevented by the existing verification processes.
However, the recent outbreak of cross-layer bugs [31, 34, 51,
56, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 82, 89, 99] poses a spectrum
of difficult challenges to the available security verification
techniques, as these attacks exploit complex and subtle interde-
pendencies between hardware and software. However, existing
verification techniques are limited in modeling and verifying
such subtle hardware/software interactions. They currently do
not scale with the size and complexity of real-world SoC
designs, allowing attackers to completely disarm the basic
security mechanisms of several millions of computer systems.
Goal and Contributions. In this paper, we analyze the effec-
tiveness of current hardware security verification techniques in
depth. We conducted two extensive case studies to systemati-
cally assess existing verification techniques with a strong focus
on bugs committed in the RTL coding. In joint collaboration
with our industry partners, we examined public Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) [51, 56, 66, 70, 71], and
compiled a list of over 30 RTL bugs based on real-world errata
such as missing case statements, wrong if-else conditions, and
flipped bus bits in parameter definitions. Even seemingly minor
RTL bugs in modern system-on-chip (SoC) implementations
can have severe consequences for security in practice due to the
complex inter-dependencies between different RTL modules.
To reproduce this effect, we implemented the list of bugs
using two popular and freely available processor designs for
the widely used open-source RISC-V architecture. The open-
source nature of RISC-V allows for chip designers to easily
design their processor microarchitecture to implement the
open-source instruction set without concerns over intellectual
property, license or royalty fees. Together with industry experts
1A behavior humorously hinted at in IBM System/360 machines in the form
of a Halt-and-Catch-Fire (HCF) instruction.
we injected the selected list of real-world bugs into the RTL
code of these two processor implementations. To evaluate how
well industry-standard tools and state-of-the-art methods can
detect these bugs, we then conducted our first case study for
the security verification of RTL code. Interestingly, during
our in-depth analysis of the list of real-world RTL bugs, we
found certain unique properties that currently pose significant
and fundamental challenges for state-of-the-art verification
techniques with respect to black-box abstraction, timing flow,
and non-register states. In particular, our experiments show that
these fundamental challenges may cause current state-of-the-
art tools to miss high-impact security bugs in the RTL code
of real-world SoCs. Often, automated verification approaches
are complemented by manual inspection and code audits
during the verification process in practice. Thus, we launched
our second case study through the international and public
hardware security competition Hack@DAC in which 54 teams
of researchers competed for three months to manually uncover
the RTL coding bugs. Our combined results from the two
case studies are alarming: particular classes of hardware bugs
entirely evade detection—even when complementing system-
atic, tool-based verification using state-of-the-art approaches
with extensive manual inspection by expert teams. Specifically,
we observe that RTL bugs arising from complex and cross-
modular interactions in real-world SoCs render RTL bugs
extremely difficult to detect in practice. Further, it may often
be feasible to exploit them from software to compromise the
entire platform, and we call such bugs HardFails. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to provide a systematic
comparison and in-depth analysis of state-of-the-art hardware
verification approaches with a focus on security-relevant bugs.
To underline the real-world security threat of HardFails, we
further construct a proof-of-concept exploit based on one of
our selected vulnerabilities from the Hack@DAC competition,
which remotely compromises the platform in a software-
only attack. With HardFails, we systematically identify the
limits of current hardware security verification approaches. Our
results indicate that additional research is required to improve
the state of the art in detection techniques available to the
semiconductor industry.
To summarize, our main contributions are:
• Stealthy hardware bugs: We identify HardFails as
bugs in RTL coding that are distinctly challenging to
detect using existing security verification techniques
and industry-leading tools. Besides evading detection,
we highlight the gravity of these bugs by demonstrat-
ing how they remain exposed to software attackers
due to the semantic gap in current hardware verifi-
cation approaches. Also, we explain the fundamental
limitations of current detection approaches in detail
using concrete examples.
• Systematic evaluation and case studies: We compile
and implement a list of RTL bugs based on real-world
vulnerabilities and provide two extensive case studies
on which we base our observations: (1) An in-depth
investigation of the Hack@DAC bugs using current
state-of-the-art and industry-leading security formal
verification tools. (2) The Hack@DAC 2018 hardware
security competition, in which 54 independent teams
of researchers competed worldwide over three months
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FIGURE 1: Typical Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)
process followed by semiconductor companies.
to find these bugs by dynamic verification approaches
such as simulation and RTL manual auditing. Our
results are alarming and demonstrate that particular
classes of bugs entirely evade detection in practice,
despite extensive security verification processes that
combine tool-based and manual analysis.
• Proof-of-concept exploit: We construct an exploit
based on a bug that evaded detection by all teams in
the competition to demonstrate the real-world threat
posed by software-based attacks in light of HardFails.
We also categorize existing attacks and show that the
recent outbreak of software-exploitable hardware bugs
may be due to the unique properties of HardFails.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in
Section II, we outline a typical Security Development Life-
cycle adopted by the semiconductor industry. In Section III,
we explain our detailed threat model. Section IV summarizes
and explains the main observations from our two in-depth
studies by giving concrete examples. Section V and Section VI
cover our systematic assessment of state-of-the-art formal
and dynamic verification and detection approaches in detail,
respectively. In Section VII, we provide our proof-of-concept
exploit. Section VIII discusses other practical issues with RTL
security verification, potential mitigations, and future work. In
Section IX, we provide a comparison of the related work, to
finally conclude in Section X.
II. SOC DEVELOPMENT CYCLE AND SECURITY
Software companies use the Security Development Life-
cycle (SDL) process for the development of secure code
[36]. This process has inspired the semiconductor companies
[22, 48, 53] to adapt and customize the process for secure
hardware design [73]. This cycle overlaps with the hardware
development lifecycle [88].
The top half of Figure 1 illustrates the chip develop-
ment lifecyle. After exploration based on market research and
competitive analysis, the product architecture is defined. This
is followed by performance and power modeling on cycle-
accurate simulators to optimize and finalize architectural de-
tails. Based on the finalized architecture, the microarchitecture
is designed and implemented in RTL. Simultaneously, pre-
silicon validation efforts are undertaken to fix functional issues.
After tape-out and fabrication, the chip is powered on and
the platform bring-up step ensures that the chip is functional.
Post-silicon validation follows, and a new stepping is spun
out if necessary. After the production stepping passes quality
requirements, the chip is shipped. Any issues found in the
field are debugged post-mortem, and appropriate patches are
released if possible, otherwise the product is recalled.
A typical SDL process followed by semiconductor vendors
consists of five phases shown in the bottom half of Figure 1.
After the product architectural features are finalized, a security
assessment is performed based on the use case of the end
product. This constitutes the first phase. In the second phase,
security objectives of the chip are defined. A comprehensive
list of assets, entry points to access those assets, adversary
model, as well as all the threats are identified. Architectural
mitigations for the threats are documented, and the security
architecture is finalized. In the third phase, the architectural
security objectives from the previous phase are translated into
microarchitectural security requirements. Security test cases
(both positive and negative) are documented. In the fourth
phase, pre-silicon security tests are conducted using dynamic
verification (i.e., simulation and emulation), as well as formal
verification, which are also complemented by manual RTL
reviews. After the chip is fabricated, post-silicon security tests
are executed as part of the fifth phase using several custom or
industry standard debug tools. The identified security bugs in
both pre-silicon and post-silicon phases are rated for severity
using the industry-standard scoring systems such as the Com-
mon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [42] or in-house
equivalents and are fixed promptly. Issues in shipping products
are handled by incident response teams.
Despite having multiple tools and validation frameworks
in industry, existing solutions for detecting security vulnera-
bilities largely rely on human expertise to define the security
test cases and run the tests. Even for experts, this is a tedious
and highly complex task where some corner case bugs can be
hard to detect using existing tools and methodologies.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
For our in-depth studies and definition of HardFails, we
investigate specific microarchitectural details at the RTL level.
As all vendors keep their proprietary industry designs and
implementations inaccessible, we use the popular open-source
RISC-V architecture and hardware micro-architecture as a
baseline [97]. RISC-V supports a wide range of possible con-
figurations with many standard features that are also available
in modern processor designs, such as privilege level separation,
virtual memory, and multi-threading, as well as more advanced
features such as configurable branch prediction and non-
blocking data caches [7], or out-of-order execution [1], making
the platform a suitable target for our study.
RISC-V RTL is freely available and open to inspection
and modification. We note that while this is not necessarily
the case for industry-leading chip designs, an adversary might
be able to reverse engineer parts of the chip. Although a highly
cumbersome and difficult task in practice, this possibility
cannot be excluded in principle. Hence, we allow an adversary
to inspect the RTL code in our model.
In particular, we make the following assumptions to evalu-
ate both existing verification approaches and possible attacks:
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• Hardware Vulnerability: the attacker has knowledge
of a vulnerability in the hardware design of the SoC
(i.e., at the RTL level) and can trigger the bug from
software.
• User Access: the attacker has complete control over
a user-space process, i.e., can issue unprivileged in-
structions and system calls. For RISC-V, this means
the attacker can execute any instruction in the basic
instruction set.
• Secure Software: software vulnerabilities and result-
ing attacks such as code-reuse [11, 13, 19, 40, 83] and
data-only attacks [20, 28, 37, 38] against the software
stack are orthogonal to the problem of cross-layer
bugs, which leverage hardware vulnerabilities from
the software layer. In our model, all platform soft-
ware could be protected by defenses such as control-
flow integrity [2] and data-flow integrity [18], or be
formally verified.
The goal of an adversary under this model is to leverage the
vulnerability on the chip to provoke unintended functionality,
e.g., access to protected memory locations, code execution with
elevated privileges, breaking the isolation of other processes
running on the platform, or permanently denying services at
the hardware level. RTL bugs in certain modules of the chip
might only be exploitable with physical access to the victim
device, for instance, bugs in the implementation of debugging
interfaces. However, software-exploitable vulnerabilities can
also be exploited completely remotely by software means,
and hence, have a higher impact in practice. For this reason,
we focus on software-exploitable RTL vulnerabilities. We also
note that an adversary with unprivileged access is a realistic
model for real-world SoCs: many platforms provide services to
other devices over the local network, or even over the internet.
Consequently, the attacker can obtain some limited software
access to the platform already, e.g., through a webserver or an
RPC interface.
The goal of the various verification approaches in this
setting is to catch all of the bugs that would be exploitable by
such an adversary before the chip design enters the production
phase. In the next section, we give an overview of why
current verification approaches face fundamental limitations in
practice.
IV. HARDFAILS: STEALTHY HARDWARE SECURITY BUGS
In this section, we first explain the nature of the bugs
we focus on for our in-depth investigation. We selected these
bugs based on real-world hardware bugs that were previously
encountered and reported in public hardware errata and CVE
lists. We then summarize our observations and explain in detail
what constitutes a HardFail, by listing the explicit properties
we encountered that make vulnerabilities extremely challeng-
ing to detect using state-of-the-art verification approaches. We
then give concrete examples of such complex vulnerabilities
in real-world open-source SoC RTL implementations.
A. Real-World RTL Bugs
We base our findings on investigating a solid represen-
tative spectrum of real-world RTL bugs. Specifically, we
inserted vulnerabilities inspired by recently published vulner-
abilities [31, 34, 51, 56, 60, 82, 89, 99], security errata, and
CVEs [62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69] from major semiconductor
manufacturing vendors and additionally new vulnerabilities
specifically tailored for RISC-V. We investigated how these
vulnerabilities can be effectively detected using formal verifi-
cation techniques (Section V) using an industry-standard tool
and in a second case study through simulation and manual
RTL analysis (Section VI).
Modern processors are highly complex and incorporate
hundreds of different in-house and potentially also third-party
Intellectual Property (IP) components. Such designs open up
plenty of room for many possible pitfalls and chances for vul-
nerabilities being introduced in the inter-modular interactions
across multiple layers of the design hierarchy. At the high-
est level, multi-core architectures typically have an intricate
interconnect fabric between individual cores (implementing
complicated communication bus protocols), multi-level cache
controllers with shared un-core and private on-core caches,
memory and interrupt controllers, as well as debug and I/O
interfaces to name a few. For each core, these high-level
components further break down to logical modules such as
fetch and decode stages, an instruction scheduler, individual
execution units, branch prediction, instruction and data caches,
the memory subsystem, and re-order buffers, and queues.
These are, in turn, implemented and connected using individual
RTL modules. The average size of each module is several
hundred code lines. As a result, real-world SoCs can easily
approach 100,000 lines of RTL code, and some open-source
designs significantly outgrow this to many millions lines of
code [76].
The majority of processors used in practice (Intel x86,
AMD x86 and ARM) are based on proprietary RTL imple-
mentations that can only be licensed and partially accessed by
other chip vendors. Hence, we do not have access to their RTL
implementations. Instead, we mimic the reported failure cases:
we reproduce these bugs by injecting them deliberately into the
RTL of a widely-used open-source SoC. Also, we investigate
complex microarchitecture features of another popular open-
source core and discover vulnerabilities already existing in its
RTL (Section IV-C). These RTL bugs usually manifest as:
• Incorrect assignment bugs associated with variables,
registers, and parameters being assigned incorrect
literal values, incorrectly connected or left floating
unintended.
• Timing bugs resulting from timing flow issues and
incorrect behavior relevant to clock signalling such as
information leakage.
• Incorrect case statement bugs in finite state machine
(FSM) descriptions such as incorrect or incomplete
selection criteria, or incorrect behaviour within a case.
• Incorrect if-else conditional bugs associated with
incorrect boolean conditions or incorrect behaviour
described within either branch.
• Specification bugs associated with a mismatch be-
tween a specified property and its actual implementa-
tion or poorly specified / under-specified behavior.
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What renders these seemingly minor RTL coding errors
as security vulnerabilities that are also very challenging to
detect during verification is how they are interconnected with
the surrounding logic. This, in turn, affects the complexity
of the side effects that they generate in their manifestation.
Some of these RTL bugs may be patched by adjusting parts
of the software stack that uses the hardware (e.g., using
firmware/microcode updates) to circumvent them and mitigate
specific exploits. However, since RTL code is usually compiled
and hardwired as integrated circuitry logic, the underlying
bugs will remain and cannot, in principle, be patched after
production. This is why RTL bugs pose a severe security threat
in practice.
Furthermore, the limited way in which current detection
approaches model hardware designs and formulate and cap-
ture security assertions raise significant challenges for current
verification approaches. Such effects aggravate the impact of
HardFails on real-world chip designs.
B. Four HardFail Properties
By analyzing the state-of-the-art verification tools and the
results from Hack@DAC 2018, we observed four distinct
properties which render RTL bugs challenging to detect—
especially when a bug exhibits multiple of these properties.
We call these the HardFail properties of a bug:
Cross-modular effects (HF-1).
Hardware modules are often interconnected in a highly hi-
erarchical design with multiple horizontal and vertical inter-
dependencies. Thus, an RTL bug located in an individual
module may trigger a vulnerability in information flow that
spans multiple complex modules. Pinpointing the bug requires
analyzing the flow across all of the relevant modules (both
intra-modular and inter-modular flows). This is highly cum-
bersome and unreliable to identify by manual inspection and
also quickly drives systematic formal verification approaches
to their limits. Existing verification approaches are focused
on systematic modeling and analysis of each RTL module to
verify whether design specifications (expressed using security
property assertions) and implementation match. Detecting vul-
nerabilities with side effects that span across multiple modules
requires loading the RTL code of all the relevant modules and
analyzing their intra- and inter-modular states. Currently, these
complex signal flows are quickly driving existing tools into a
state explosion problem due to the exponential relationships in
the underlying modeling algorithms [23, 32]. While providing
additional computational resources is often used as an ad-
hoc solution, these resources are usually quickly outgrown
as a modeled module and flow complexity increase. Selective
"black-box" abstraction of some of the modules, state space
constraining, and bounded-model checking are some tech-
niques that help decrease the state space explosion. However,
they do not eliminate the underlying limitations. Additionally,
these techniques introduce false negatives, and hence, they are
less reliable since vulnerabilities may be missed if the black-
boxing and constraining decisions are not well-reasoned by
the verification engineer. Thus, to scale with complex SoC
designs, current state-of-the-art verification approaches require
interactive input and feedback from a human expert in practice.
In case the human expert’s input is erroneous, the verification
results are essentially void.
Timing-flow gap (HF-2).
Existing verification techniques validate security properties by
checking a set of property assertions, invariants, and the ab-
sence of illegal information flows against a model of the target
hardware design. However, the currently available industry-
standard approaches and tools are very limited in this respect.
This lack of expressiveness becomes especially apparent when
verifying security properties related to timing flow (in terms
of clock cycle latency) of the logic described in the RTL code.
In practice, this leads to vast sources of information leakage
due to software-exploitable timing channels (see Section IX).
At RTL, a timing flow or channel exists from the circuit
inputs to outputs when the number of clock cycles that is
required for the outputs to be generated depends on the values
of the inputs or the current memory/register state. This can
be exploited to leak sensitive information when the timing
variation is discernible by an adversary and can be used to infer
inputs or memory states. In the RTL code, this is especially
problematic for information flows and resource sharing across
different privilege levels. This timing variation should remain
indistinguishable in the RTL implementation or measuring
from software should be prevented. However, current industry-
standard security verification techniques focus exclusively on
the functional information flow of the logic and fail to model
the associated timing flow. The complexity of timing-related
security issues is further aggravated when the timing flow
along a logic path spans multiple modules and involves various
interdependencies.
Cache-state gap (HF-3).
Existing verification tools offer support for modeling the
hardware modules and validating its security properties, e.g.,
in the form of assertions and invariants. Since they are mainly
derived from (and still used in combination with) functional
verification, they do not provide integrated support for model-
ing and reasoning on the properties of non-register states in the
design, such as caches. This can lead to severe security vulner-
abilities arising due to state changes that are unaccounted for,
e.g., cache state changes across privilege levels. In particular,
current tools reason about the architectural state of a processor
by exclusively focusing on the state of registers. However, this
definition of the architectural state completely discards that
modern processors feature a highly complex microarchitecture
and diverse hierarchy of non-register caches. This problem
is amplified as these caches have multiple levels and shared
across multiple privilege levels. Caches represent a state that is
influenced directly or indirectly by many control-path signals.
This may generate security vulnerabilities in their interactions
with the processor register states, such as illegal information
channel leakages across different privilege levels. Due to these
significant limitations, automatically identifying RTL bugs that
trigger such vulnerabilities currently is beyond the capabilities
of existing approaches.
Hardware/firmware interactions (HF-4). Some RTL bugs re-
main indiscernible to hardware security verification techniques
because they are not explicitly vulnerable unless triggered
by the overlying firmware. While many SoC access control
policies are directly implemented in hardware, some of them
are programmable by the firmware to allow for post-silicon
flexibility. Hence, reasoning on whether an RTL bug exists is
inconclusive when considering the hardware RTL in isolation.
These vulnerabilities would only materialize when the hard-
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ware/firmware interactions are considered in combination and
how the firmware programs relevant registers in the underlying
hardware is modeled in the tool. Again, we found that this type
of vulnerability is largely beyond the scope of existing tools,
which have little to no support for cross-verification beyond
a relatively small number of cycles, which cannot account for
complex real-world firmware.
C. Concrete Examples for HardFails
Next, we describe concrete examples for some of the
bugs we encountered during our analysis of two different
RISC-V SoCs, Ariane [77] and PULPissimo [78]. All these
bugs are particularly challenging to detect using standard
verification approaches. Ariane is a 6-stage in-order RISC-V
CPU that implements the RISC-V draft privilege specification
and can run a RISC-V Linux OS. It is implemented with a
memory management unit (MMU) that consists of data and
instruction transaction lookaside buffers (TLBs), a hardware
page table walker, and a simple branch prediction unit to
enable speculative execution. Figure 5 in Appendix A shows its
microarchitecture. PULPissimo is an SoC based on a smaller
and simpler RISC-V core with both instruction and data RAM
(see Figure 2). It provides an Advanced Extensible Interface
(AXI) for accessing memory from the cores, with peripherals
on an Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB) which is used to
connect peripherals to the AXI through a bridge module.
It provides support for autonomous I/O, external interrupt
controllers and integration of hardware processing engines. It
also features a debug unit and an SPI slave [90].
TLB Page Fault Timing Side Channel (HF-1 & HF-2).
On analyzing the RTL of Ariane, we observed that TLB page
faults due to illegal accesses occur in a different number of
clock cycles than page faults that occur due to unmapped
memory (we contacted the developers and they acknowledged
the vulnerability). This timing disparity in the RTL man-
ifests in the microarchitectural behaviour of the processor.
Thus, it constitutes a software-visible side channel due to
the measurable clock-cycle difference of the two cases. Pre-
vious work already demonstrated how this can be exploited
by user-space adversaries to probe mapped and unmapped
pages. For instance, they can be used to break randomization-
based defenses [35, 41, 45, 98]. Timing-related flows can
be captured by appropriate assertions that could be defined
according to the security spec of the processor. However, there
are significant challenges of detecting this bug in practice:
We identify at least seven RTL modules that would need to
be modeled, analyzed and verified in combination, namely:
“mmu.sv” - “nbdcache.sv” - 2 “tlb.sv” instantiations - "ptw.sv"
- "load_unit.sv" - “store_unit.sv”. Besides modeling their inter-
and intra-modular logic flows, the timing flows would need to
be modeled and tracked to formally prove absence of timing
channel leakage, which is not supported by current industry-
standard tools. Hence, the only remaining alternative is to
verify this property by manually inspecting and following the
clock cycle transitions. Naturally, investigating the behavior
of the relevant RTL logic is highly cumbersome and error-
prone. However, these checks must be performed, no matter
how complex the design modules are. It must be verified that
timing side-channel resilience is implemented in the design (to
match the security specification if required) and furthermore,
that it is implemented correctly and bug-free in the RTL. We
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FIGURE 2: Hardware overview of the PULPissimo SoC. Each
bug icon indicates the presence of at least one security vulner-
ability in the module.
show the RTL hierarchy of the Ariane core in Figure 6 in
Appendix A to illustrate its complexity.
Pre-Fetched Cache State Not Rolled Back (HF-1 & HF-3).
We observed another issue in Ariane with the cache state: when
a system return instruction is executed, where the privilege
level of the core is not changed until this instruction is
retired. Before retirement, linear fetching (guided by branch
prediction) of data and instructions following the unretired
system return instruction continues at the current higher system
privilege level. Once the instruction is retired, the execution
mode of the core is changed to the unprivileged level, but
the entries that were prefetched into the cache (at the system
privilege level) do not get flushed. While we did not con-
struct an end-to-end attack to exploit, this and such shared
cache entries are visible to user-space software, enabling
timing channels between privileged and unprivileged software
in principle. Verifying the implementation of all the flush
control signals and their behaviour in all different states of
the processor requires examining at least eight RTL modules:
"ariane.sv" - "controller.sv" - "frontend.sv" - "id_stage.sv" -
"icache.sv" - "fetch_fifo" - "ariane_pkg.sv" - "csr_regfile.sv"
(see Figure 6). This is highly complex because it requires
identifying and defining all the relevant security properties to
be checked across these RTL modules. Since current industry-
standard approaches do not support expressive capturing and
the verification of non-register state changes, such as caches,
this issue in the RTL can currently only be found by manual
inspection.
Firmware-Configured Memory Ranges (HF-4).
In preparation for Hack@DAC 2018, we added peripherals
to Pulpissimo and injected bugs in them to reproduce bugs
from real-world hardware errata. Among the peripherals, we
added is an AES encryption/decryption engine whose input
key is stored and fetched from memory tightly coupled to the
processor. Further detail on the bug is shown in Section V.
The memory address that the key is stored in is unknown,
and whether it is within the protected memory range or not
is inconclusive by observing the RTL alone. In real-world
scenarios, the AES key is stored in programmable fuses. Upon
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system start-up, the firmware has to read the key from the fuses
to registers or protected memory that only the AES engine is
permitted to access. The firmware would usually also program
relevant registers in the underlying hardware to configure the
memory address ranges and relevant access control policies.
While the information flow of the AES key is strictly defined
in hardware, its location is actually controlled by the firmware.
Hence, reasoning on whether the information flow is allowed
or not using conventional hardware verification approaches is
inconclusive when considering the RTL code in isolation. The
vulnerable hardware/firmware interactions cannot be identified
unless both the hardware and the firmware are co-verified.
Unfortunately, current industry-standard tools do not support
such an analysis.
Memory Address Range Overlap (HF-1 & HF-4).
Pulpissimo provides I/O support to its peripherals by mapping
them to different memory address ranges. If an address range
overlap bug is accidentally committed at design-time or by
the firmware, this can break access control policies and have
critical security consequences, e.g., privilege escalation. We
injected an RTL bug where there is address range overlap
between the SPI Master Peripheral and the SoC Control
Peripheral which allowed the untrusted SPI Master to access
the SoC Control memory address range over the AMBA APB
bus. Verifying issues at the SoC interconnect in complex ARM
bus protocols is highly challenging since too many modules
needed to support the interconnect have to be modeled to
properly test the bug. This greatly increases the scope and the
complexity of the bug far beyond just a few modules. Such
an effect causes an explosion of the state space, since all the
possible states have to be modeled accurately to remain sound.
While proof kits for accelerated certification of advanced SoC
interconnect protocols were introduced to mitigate this effect
for a small number of bus protocols specifically (here, AMBA3
and AMBA4), this requires an add-on to the default software
and many protocols are not supported [58].
V. IN-DEPTH STUDY OF DETECTION OF HARDFAILS
In practice, hardware-security verification engineers use a
combination of techniques such as formal verification, simula-
tion, emulation, and manual inspection. We focus in our first
case study (and in this section) on evaluating the effectiveness
of industry-standard formal verification techniques used for de-
tecting hardware security bugs. The next section describes the
effectiveness of simulation and manual inspection techniques
used by the teams in our competition. We emphasize that in
a real-world security testing (see Section II), engineers will
not have prior knowledge of the specific vulnerabilities they
are trying to find. Our goal, however, is to investigate how an
industry-standard tool can detect RTL bugs that we deliberately
inject in an open-source SoC and have prior knowledge of (see
Table I). We then analyze our results in this controlled setting
to identify why and how current tools fail to detect these bugs.
A. Detection Methodology
We examined each of the injected bugs and its nature
in order to determine which formal technique would be best
suited to detect it. Our results in this study are based on two
formal techniques: Formal Property Verification (FPV) and
Security Path Verification (SPV) [17]. They represent the state
FIGURE 3: Verification results grouped by bug class.
of art in hardware security verification routinely used through-
out the semiconductor industry [6]. FPV checks whether a
set of security properties, usually specified as SystemVerilog
Assertions (SVA), hold true for the given RTL. To describe
our assertions correctly, we examined the location of each
bug in the RTL and how it is manifested in the behavior
of the surrounding logic and input/output relationships. Once
we specified the security properties using assert, assume and
cover statements, we determined which RTL modules we need
to model to prove these assertions. If a security property is
violated, the tool generates a counterexample; this example is
examined to ensure whether the intended security property is
indeed violated or a false alarm.
SPV is used to detect bugs which specifically involve
unauthorized information flow. Such properties cannot be
directly captured using SVA/PSL assertions. SPV uses path
sensitization techniques to exhaustively and formally check
if unauthorized data propagates (through a functional path)
from a source to a destination signal. To specify the SPV
properties, we identified source signals where the sensitive
information was located and destination signals where it should
not propagate. We then identified the bounding preconditions
to constrain the paths that the tool searches. Similar to FPV,
we identified the modules that are required to capture the
information flow. This includes source and destination mod-
ules, intermediate modules, and modules that generate control
signals which interfere with the information flow. While it is
simpler to include all design RTL modules, this often leads
to a memory-usage explosion and is not practical for more
complex SoC designs. It is necessary to select which modules
are relevant for the properties being tested and which can be
safely black-boxed which is time-consuming, error-prone and
requires expertise. On the other hand, black-boxing introduces
the possibility of false negatives and unreliable results. The
absence of a counterexample to an assertion or flow property is
inconclusive as to whether the assertion is indeed not violated
or if the vulnerability is missed due to incorrect abstraction.
B. Detection Results
Out of the 31 bugs we investigated, shown in Table I, using
the formal verification techniques described above, only 15
or 48%, were detected. While we tried to detect all 31 bugs
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# Bug Type SPV FPV Hack@DAC Modules Lines of code
1 Address range overlap between peripherals SPI Master and SoC. Inserted 3 3 3 91 6685
2 Addresses for L2 memory is out of the specified range. Native 3 3 3 43 6746
3 Processor runs code on incorrect privilege level for the CSR. Native 7 3 3 2 1186
4 Register that controls GPIO lock can be written to with software. Inserted 3 3 7 2 408
5 Reset clears the GPIO lock control register. Inserted 3 3 7 2 408
6 Incorrect address range for APB allows memory aliasing. Inserted 3 3 7 1 110
7 AXI address decoder ignores errors. Inserted 7 3 7 1 227
8 Address range overlap between GPIO, SPI, and SoC control peripherals. Inserted 3 3 3 68 14635
9 Incorrect password checking logic in debug unit. Inserted 7 3 7 4 436
10 Advanced debug unit only checks 31 of the 32 bits of the password. Inserted 7 3 7 4 436
11 Able to access debug register when in halt mode. Native 7 3 3 2 887
12 Password check for the debug unit does not reset after successful check. Inserted 7 3 3 4 436
13 Faulty decoder state machine logic in RISC-V core results in a hang. Native 7 3 3 2 1119
14 Incomplete case statement in ALU can cause unpredictable behavior. Native 7 3 3 2 1152
15 Faulty timing logic in the RTC results in inaccurate calculation of time. Native 7 3 7 1 191
16 Reset for the advanced debug unit not operational. Inserted 7 7 3 4 436
17 Memory-mapped register file allows code injection. Native 7 7 3 1 134
18 Non-functioning cryptography module causes DOS. Inserted 7 7 7 24 2651
19 Insecure hash function in the cryptography module. Inserted 7 7 7 24 2651
20 Cryptographic key for AES stored in unprotected memory. Inserted 7 7 7 57 8955
21 Temperature sensor is muxed with the cryptography modules. Inserted 7 7 3 1 65
22 ROM size is too small preventing execution of security code. Inserted 7 7 3 1 751
23 Disabled zero RISC-V core. Inserted 7 7 7 1 282
24 GPIO enable always high. Inserted 7 7 7 1 392
25 Secure mode not required to write to RISC-V core control registers. Inserted 7 7 3 1 745
26 Advanced debug unit password is hard-coded and set on reset. Inserted 7 7 3 1 406
27 Secure mode is not required to write to interrupt registers. Inserted 7 7 3 1 303
28 JTAG interface is not password protected. Native 7 7 3 1 441
29 Output of MAC is not erased on reset. Inserted 7 7 3 1 65
30 Supervisor mode signal of a core is floating preventing the use of SMAP. Native 7 7 3 1 282
31 GPIO is able to read/write to instruction and data cache. Native 7 7 3 1 151
TABLE I: Detection results based on formal verification (SPV and FPV), and manual inspection combined with simula-
tion (Hack@DAC). Check and cross marks indicate detected and undetected PULPissimo SoC bugs respectively.
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formally, we were only able to formulate security properties for
only 17 bugs. This indicates that the main challenge with using
formal verification tools is identifying and expressing security
properties that the tools are capable of capturing and checking.
Bugs due to ambiguous specifications of interconnect logic,
for instance, are examples of bugs that are difficult to create
security properties for. Our results, shown in the SPV and FPV
bars of Figure 3, indicate that integer overflow and address
overlap bugs had the best detection rates, 80% and 100%,
respectively. These classes of bugs typically involved a variable
being assigned a value that is outside of the range documented
in the specification, which is trivial to detect using an assertion.
For privilege escalation and denial-of-service (DoS) bugs, the
detection rate is only 50%, while secret leakage and incorrect
use of crypto bugs went undetected. The implications of these
findings are especially grave for real-world more complex SoC
designs where these bug classes are highly relevant from a
security standpoint.
C. Limitations and Challenges
In real-world security testing, detecting all the bugs without
prior knowledge of them (with knowledge only of the adver-
sary model and security specifications) would be significantly
more challenging. However, we assume prior knowledge of
the bugs in this investigation, since we aim to shed light on
the limitations of the tools. We discuss in detail below some
of the bugs that were more challenging for us to detect.
Bug #20: Incorrect use of crypto. As mentioned in
Section IV-C, the AES unit added to the PULPissimo stores
its cryptographic key in the unprotected memory. This is not
detectable by current formal verification tools because the ad-
dress where the key is stored at is unknown to the verification
engineer since it is determined by the firmware. This prevents
the verification engineer from writing an assertion capable of
detecting the bug using FPV or SPV.
Bugs #1 and #2: Memory address range overlap and
data overflow. The address range of the L2 memory imple-
mented in the RTL does not match its specification in the
SoC documentation. According to the specifications, the range
should be 0x1C00_0000 to 0x1C08_0000. However, in the
RTL the address range is 0x1C01_0000 to 0x1C08_2000,
as shown in Listing 1. This range does not overlap with the
memory maps of other parts of the SoC but does decrease the
total space mapped to the L2 memory. To detect this bug, we
wrote an assertion, shown in Listing 2, to check if the address
used by the Tightly-Coupled Data Memory (TCDM) is within
the range specified by the documentation. Using this assertion,
with FPV we should be able to detect this bug. However, we
have had difficulty loading the environment for this test due to
the large number of modules needed to test this bug: The bug
resides at the interconnect level of the SoC. Therefore, all the
modules needed to support the interconnect are also needed
to properly test the bug. This greatly increases the scope and
thus causing an explosion of state space since all possible states
have to be modeled accurately to remain sound.
Bugs #25 and #27: Privilege Escalation. We also in-
serted several trivial bugs. For instance, we replaced the
PULP_SECURE variable, which controls access privileges to
the registers, with the PULP_SEC variable. While only a minor
change, the results are critical for security: PULP_SEC is a
hardwired constant (i.e., it is always true). Hence, secure mode
is not required to write to the interrupt control registers of
the core any longer. While conceptually very simple, this is
a realistic bug that could be exploited easily by attackers,
e.g., by installing a malicious interrupt handler. Neither is
this type of bug detectable by current formal verification tools
nor was it found by any team through manual inspection and
dynamic testing. Interestingly, current tool-based approaches
seem to miss such bugs because they cannot handle multiple
declarations in the RTL code. We describe some of the bugs
we inserted in greater detail in Appendix B.
LISTING 1: Data overflow RTL: The L2 memory address
range is defined incorrectly.
localparam logic [ADDR_WIDTH-1:0]
TCDM_START_ADDR = {32’h1C01_0000}; //
Start of L2 interleaved
localparam logic [ADDR_WIDTH-1:0]
TCDM_END_ADDR = {32’h1C08_2000}; // END of
L2 interleaved
LISTING 2: Data overflow assertion: The RTL shown in
listing 1 is checked to see if the address signal of the TCDM
is within the range specified by the documentation.
always @ (posedge clk) begin
for(i=0; i<5; i++) begin
if (TCDM_data_gnt_DEM_TO_XBAR[i] == 1’b1)
begin
a_addr_range_check: assert
((TCDM_data_add_DEM_TO_XBAR[i] >=
32’h1C00_0000) &&
(TCDM_data_add_DEM_TO_XBAR[i] <=
32’h1C08_0000));
end
end
end
VI. CROWDSOURCING DETECTION
We present next the results of our second case study.
54 teams of researchers participated in Hack@DAC 2018,
a recently conducted capture-the-flag competition to identify
hardware bugs that were injected deliberately in real-world
open-source SoC designs. This is the equivalent of bug bounty
programs that semiconductor companies offer [24, 44, 79, 81].
The teams were free to use any testing techniques. However,
they all eventually relied on simulation and manual inspec-
tion methods, because they are easier, more accessible, and
require less expertise than formal verification, especially when
working under time constraints. We injected the bugs in a
joint collaboration with our industry partner inspired by their
hardware security expertise. Specifically, some bugs mimic
real-world errata and publicly reported vulnerabilities from
CVE lists to reproduce realistic bugs that were previously
encountered. The goal is to investigate how well these bugs
can be detected through dynamic verification and manual RTL
audit without prior knowledge of the bugs. The competition
consisted of two phases: a preliminary Phase 1 and final Phase
2 which featured the RISC-V Pulpino and Pulpissimo SoCs,
respectively.
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A. Hack@DAC 2018 Goals
To prepare the SoCs for the competition, we first imple-
mented additional security features into them, then defined
the security objectives and adversary model and accordingly
inserted the bugs into them. Specifying the security objectives
and the adversary model will enable the teams to identify what
would be defined as a security bug.
Security Features: We added password-based locks on the
JTAG modules of both SoCs and access control on certain
peripherals. For the Phase-2 SoC, we also added a cryptogra-
phy unit implementing multiple cryptographic algorithms. We
injected bugs into these features and native features to generate
security threats as a result.
Security Objectives: We provided the three main security ob-
jectives of the target SoCs to the teams. Firstly, an unprivileged
code should not escalate beyond its privilege level. Secondly,
the JTAG module should be protected against an adversary
with physical access. Finally, the SoCs should thwart software
adversaries launching denial of service attacks.
B. Hack@DAC 2018 Overview
For the first phase of the competition, we chose the Pulpino
SoC since it was a real-world yet not overly complex SoC
design for the teams to work with. It features a RISC-V simple
core with both instruction and data RAM, an AXI interconnect
for accessing memory, with peripherals on an APB able to
access the AXI through a bridge module. It also features
a boot ROM to store boot code, a debug unit and a serial
peripheral interface (SPI) slave [93]. We inserted security bugs
in multiples modules of the SoC, including the AXI, the APB,
debug unit, GPIO, and the bridge.
For the second phase, we chose the Pulpissimo SoC [90],
shown in Figure 2, since it supported integrating hardware
processing engines, a new input/output subsystem (UDMA),
and more peripherals. This allowed us to extend the SoC with
additional security features, making room for inserting more
bugs in them. Bugs were also inserted into the native features
of the SoC, while native security bugs were also discovered
afterwards. We describe some of these bugs below (more
details in Appendix B).
• UDMA address range overlap: We modified the
memory range of the UDMA implementation so that
it overlapped with the master port to the SPI. This
bug allows an adversary with access to the UMDA
memory to escalate its privileges and modify the
memory of the SPI.
• GPIO address range overlap: The address range
of the GPIO memory was erroneously declared. An
adversary with GPIO access can escalate its privilege
and access the SPI Master and SoC Control.
• Error in GPIO Status: GPIO enable was rigged to
display a fixed erroneous status of ’1’, which did not
give the user a correct display of the actual GPIO
status.
• Untrusted Boot ROM: A native bug in the SoC
would allow unprivileged compromise of the boot
ROM and potentially the execution of untrusted boot
code at a privileged level, allowing exfiltration of
sensitive information.
• Erroneous AXI Finite-State Machine: We injected a
bug in the AXI address decoder module such that if an
error signal is generated on the memory bus while the
underlining logic is still handling an outstanding trans-
action, the next signal to be handled will instead be
considered operational by the module unconditionally.
This bug can be exploited to intentionally cause com-
putational faults in the execution of security critical
code (we outline how to exploit this vulnerability—
which was not detected by all teams—in Section VII).
C. Hack@DAC 2018 Results
We were able to draw various insights from the bug reports
submitted by all the competitors and we indicate the results in
the Manual & Simulation column in Table I.
Analyzing the Bug Reports: The bug reports submitted by
teams provided insight into what types of bugs are harder
to detect using existing approaches and which modules are
harder to analyze. Together with our industry experts, we
scanned the submissions and rated the bug submissions on the
accuracy and detail provided by the teams, e.g., bug validity,
the methodology used, and the security impact.
Detected Bugs: There were two highly detected bugs in
Pulpissimo. The first was a bug where the debug IPs were
used when not intended, due to our added security parameters.
The second bug was where we declared a local parameter
PULP_SEC, which was always set to ’1’, instead of the
intended PULP_SECURE. The former was detected because
debugging interfaces represent security-critical regions of the
chip. The latter was detected because it indicated intuitively
that exploiting this parameter would lead to privilege escalation
attacks. Hence, the teams prioritized inspecting these modules
during the competition.
Undetected Bugs: Many of the inserted bugs were not
detected. One was in the advanced debug unit, where the
password bit index register has an overflow (bug #9). This
is an example of a security flaw that would be hard to detect
by methods other than verification. Moreover, the presence of
a lot of other bugs within the advanced debug unit password
checker further masked this bug. Another bug was that of the
cryptographic unit key storage in unprotected memory (bug
#20). Current formal verification approaches cannot detect this
bug. By manual inspection, the teams could not also detect this
bug as they focused exclusively on the RTL code in isolation
and did not consider HW/FW interactions.
HardFails and Limitations of Manual Analysis: While man-
ual analysis can detect the widest array of bugs, our analysis of
the competition results reveals its limitations. Manual analysis
is qualitative and is difficult to scale to cross-layer and more
complex bugs. In Table I, there are 16 cross-module bugs
(spanning more than one module), and only 9 of which were
identified using manual inspection in the competition. We see
that three of these bugs (18, 19, and 20) were also undetected
by formal verification methods, which is 10% of the bugs
we investigated in our case studies. In the following section,
we show how a HardFail can be easily exploited by software
means to bypass the security of an SoC.
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FIGURE 4: Our attack exploits a bug in the implementation
of the memory bus of the PULPissimo SoC: by 1 spamming
the bus with invalid transactions an adversary can make 4
malicious write requests be set to operational.
VII. EXPLOITING HARDWARE BUGS FROM SOFTWARE
We show how selected hardware bugs from
Hack@DAC 2018 can be used to craft a real-world exploit.
Such exploits allow unprivileged attackers to undermine the
entire system by escalating privileges in an entirely remote
setting. The attack is depicted in Figure 4 in which we
assume the memory bus decoder unit (unit of the memory
interconnect) to have a bug, which causes errors to be ignored
under certain conditions (see bug number #7 in Table I).
This RTL vulnerability manifests in the hardware behaving
in the following way. When an error signal is generated
on the memory bus while the underlining logic is still
handling an outstanding transaction, the next signal to be
handled will instead be considered operational by the module
unconditionally. This represents a severe vulnerability, as it
allows erroneous memory accesses to slip through hardware
checks at runtime. Despite this fact, we only managed to
detect this vulnerability after significant efforts using FPV
based on our prior knowledge of the exact location of the
vulnerability. Additionally, the tool-based (but interactive)
verification procedure represented a significant costly time
investment. Since vulnerabilities are usually not known a
priori in practice, this would even be more challenging.
Therefore, it is easily conceivable and realistic to assume that
such a vulnerability could slip through verification and evade
detection in larger real-world SoCs.
Armed with the knowledge about this vulnerability in a
real-world processor, an adversary could now force memory
access errors to slip through the checks as we describe in the
following. In the first step 1 , the attacker generates a user
program (Task A) that registers a dummy signal handler for the
segmentation fault (SIGSEGV) access violation. This first pro-
gram then executes a loop with 2 a faulting memory access to
an invalid memory address (e.g., LWx5, 0x0). This will gen-
erate an error in the memory subsystem of the processor and
issue an invalid memory access interrupt (i.e., 0x0000008C)
to the processor. The processor raises this interrupt to the
running software (in this case the OS), using the pre-configured
interrupt handler routines in software. The interrupt handler in
the OS will then forward this as a signal to the faulting task
3 , which keeps looping and continuously generating invalid
accesses. Meanwhile, the attacker launches a separate Task B,
which will then issue single memory access 4 to a privileged
memory location (e.g., LWx6, 0xf77c3000).
In this situation, multiple outstanding memory transactions
will be generated on the memory bus; all but one of which
the address decoder will signal an error. An invalid memory
access will always proceed the single access of the second
task. Due to the bug in the memory bus address decoder, 5 the
malicious memory access will become operational instead
of triggering an error. As a result, the attacker can issue read
and write instructions to arbitrary privileged (and unprivileged)
memory by forcing the malicious, illegal access with preceding
faulty access. Using this technique the attacker can eventually
leverage this read-write primitive, e.g., 6 to escalate privileges
by writing the process control block (PCBB) for his task to
elevate the corresponding process to root. This bug leaves the
attacker with access to a root process, gaining control over the
entire platform and potentially compromising all the processes
running on the system.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We discuss next why microcode patching is not sufficient
for RTL bugs. While this emphasizes the necessity of ad-
vancing pre-silicon security verification tools, we also shed
light on the additional challenges associated with the hardware
security verification process altogether and how it can be
further improved.
A. Microcode Patching
While existing industry SoCs support hot-fixes by mi-
crocode patching, this approach is inherently limited to a
handful of changes to the instruction set architecture, e.g.,
modifying the interface of individual complex instructions
and adding or removing instructions. Thus, such patches at
this higher abstraction level in the firmware only act as a
"symptomatic" fix that circumvent the RTL bug. But they
are not able to solve the fundamental problem in the RTL
implementation, which is usually realized as hardwired cir-
cuits. Therefore, microcode patching is a fallback for RTL
bugs discovered after production when it is too late by then
to patch the RTL. They also usually come at the cost of a
significant performance impact that may be avoided altogether
if the underlying problem is discovered and fixed pre-silicon.
B. Additional Challenges in Practice
Our findings listed in Section IV are based on our in-
vestigation on the efficacy of using industry-standard tools
for detecting hardware security bugs. In practice, there are
additional challenges to that affect both the difficulty of
detecting HardFails and their impact.
IP Reuse. Some HardFails arise when the RTL code base for
one product is re-purposed for a different product that has a
very different set of security requirements and usage scenario.
This is the very nature of hardware design and IP reuse which
introduces challenges in replicating the security verification
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process. Parameters may be declared multiple times within
this new product; they get misinterpreted by industry-standard
tools, causing bugs to go undetected.
Functional vs. Security Specifications. When designing
hardware, the system implementation naturally deviates from
its product specification, especially when system complexity
increases and specification ambiguity arises. Ideally product
specification and its implementation must fully match by the
time the product is ready for deployment. This is typically
accomplished through pre-silicon and post-silicon verification
efforts. This deviation in the implementation is a result of
several functional and security bugs. A functional bug is a
violation of the functional specification, that generates an
incorrect result. These bugs are typically detected when val-
idating the implementation against functional objectives as
detailed out in a functional test plan. Security bugs or security
vulnerabilities involve unconsidered scenarios and corner cases
within the specification that make the product vulnerable to
attacks. Often, several functional bugs can also be chained
to create a security bug. These are typically detected when
validating the system implementation against product security
objectives laid out in a security test plan, which is derived
from the threat model under consideration. It is important, in
practice, to clearly distinguish between functional and security
specifications since these are often the references for different
verification teams.
Specification Ambiguity. One of the biggest challenges in
practice is anticipating and identifying all the security prop-
erties that are required in a real-world scenario. We analyzed
the efficacy of industry-standard tools in a controlled setting—
where we purposefully inject selected bugs and have prior
knowledge of them. However, in practice this is not the
case: hardware validation teams do not have prior knowledge
of the bugs that they need to detect. Security specifications
are often incomplete and ambiguous, often only outlining
the required security properties under an assumed adversary
model. These would not hold anymore once the adversary
model is changed. Furthermore, specs usually do not specify
bugs and information flows that are not allowed to exist and
there is no automated or systematic approach to reason whether
one is in fact proving the intended properties. This can be
alleviated to some extent by introducing machine-readable
specifications [80]. However, specification ambiguity can cause
information leakage from a combination of incomplete or
incorrect design decisions and implementation errors.
C. Improving Detection
The state of the art in security verification currently relies
on repurposed tools from functional verification. These are a
small number of detection techniques that fail to adequately
model many types of vulnerabilities. Although manual code
inspection is generally useful and can potentially cover a wide
array of bugs, its quality and efficacy depend exclusively on
the engineer conducting the RTL audit. This is inefficient and
unreliable in light of rapidly evolving and constantly growing
chip designs. Furthermore, exhaustive testing of specifications
through simulation requires exponential amounts of resources
in the size of the input (i.e., RTL code) while coverage must be
intelligently maximized. Hence, current approaches face severe
scalability challenges, as diagnosing software-exploitable bugs
that reside deep in the design pipeline can require simulation
of trillions of cycles [21] in practice.
During our investigation of the RTL vulnerabilities, we
noticed that it would often be beneficial to first identify areas
with high risks due to software exposure, such as password
checkers, crypto cores, and control registers, and then test them
with a higher priority (this was also noted by some of the
teams).
Scalability due to complex interdependencies among mod-
ules is one of the challenges in detection. Vulnerabilities asso-
ciated with non-register states (such as caches) or clock-cycle
dependencies (i.e., timing flows) are also another problem.
Initial research is underway [57] to analyze a limited amount of
low-level firmware running on top of a simulated RTL design
for information and timing flow violations. However, these
approaches are still at its infancy, not yet widely available
and of questionable scalability for real-world SoC designs.
Finally, current verification approaches focus on register-state
based analysis, e.g., to monitor whether sensitive locations are
accessible from unprivileged signal sources. Further research
is required in explicitly modelling and verifying non-register
states and timing flows. Potential research directions include
exploring hybrid approaches where formal methods can be
used to guide optimized coverage (via fuzzing) of dynamic
testing of RTL.
IX. RELATED WORK
We present here related work in hardware security verifica-
tion while identifying their limitations with respect to detecting
HardFails. We also provide an overview of recent software
attacks exploiting the underlying hardware vulnerabilities.
A. Current Detection Approaches
Security-aware design and verification of hardware have
gained significance and traction only recently as the criti-
cal security threat posed by hardware vulnerabilities became
acutely established. Confidentiality and integrity are the most
commonly investigated properties [29] in hardware security.
They are usually expressed using information flow properties
between entities at different security levels. Besides manual
inspection and simulation-based techniques, systematic ap-
proaches proposed for verifying security properties in hardware
include: formal verification methods such as proof assistance,
model-checking, symbolic execution, and information flow
tracking.
Proof assistant and theorem-proving methods rely on
mathematically modeling the system and the required security
properties into logical theorems and formally proving if the
model complies with the properties. VeriCoq [10] based on
the Coq proof assistant transforms the Verilog code that de-
scribes the hardware design into proof-carrying code. VeriCoq
supports the automated conversion of only a subset of Verilog
code into Coq and subsequent works [9, 46] automate the
creation of the theorems and proofs and check information
flow properties. However, this assumes accurate labeling of the
initial sensitivity labels of each and every signal in order to
effectively track the flow of information. This is cumbersome,
error-prone and would never scale in practice beyond toy
examples to complex real-world designs. Timing (and other)
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side-channel information flows are not modeled and there is
room for false positives. Finally, computational scalability to
verifying real-world complex SoCs remains an issue given
that the proof verification for a single AES core requires 30
minutes to complete [9].
Model checking-based approaches are widely used in
industry-standard tools. A given property is checked against
the modeled state space and possible state transitions using
provided invariants and predefined conditions. Such techniques
remain limited in terms of scalability as computation time
scales exponentially with the model and state space size. This
can be alleviated by using abstraction to simplify the model
or constraining the state space to a bounded number of states
using assumptions and conditions. However, this introduces
false positives and missed vulnerabilities and requires expert
knowledge. Most industry-leading tools, such as the one we
use in this work, rely on model checking algorithms such as
boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) solvers and property spec-
ification schemes, e.g., assertion-based verification to verify the
required properties of a given hardware design.
Side-channel leakage modeling and detection remain
an open problem. Recent work [101] uses the Murϕ model
checker to verify different hardware cache architectures for
side-channel leakage against different adversary models. A
formal verification methodology for SGX and Sanctum en-
claves under a limited adversary was introduced in [86].
However, such approaches are not directly applicable to the
hardware implementation. They also rely exclusively on formal
verification and remain inherently limited by the underlying
algorithms in terms of scalability and state space explosion,
besides demanding particular effort and expertise to use.
Information flow analysis (such as SPV) are better suited
for this purpose where a data variable or input is assigned a se-
curity label (or a taint), and the taint propagation is monitored.
This way, the designer can verify whether the system adheres
to the required security policies. Recent works have demon-
strated the effectiveness of hardware information flow tracking
(IFT) in identifying security vulnerabilities, including uninten-
tional timing side channels and intentional information leakage
through hardware Trojans. IFT techniques are proposed at
different levels of abstraction: gate-, RT, and language-levels.
Gate-level information flow tracking (GLIFT) [74, 91, 92]
performs the IFT analysis directly at gate-level by generating
GLIFT analysis logic that is derived from the original logic
and operates in parallel to it. Initially [74, 92], the GLIFT
logic was fabricated along with the original logic, hence,
incurring unreasonably high overheads in area, power, and
performance. More recent works [75, 91] applied GLIFT to
the gate netlist only during simulation/verification and stripped
it off before fabrication. While gate-level IFT logic is easier
to automatically generate, it does not scale well with design
size. Furthermore, the authors in [47] reason that when infor-
mation flow tracking uses strict non-interference, this taints
any information flow as a vulnerability. However, in reality,
this is not the case. By relaxing the strict property of non-
interference, "how much" of the tainted data flows is quantified
using information theoretic methods and a GLIFT/information
theoretic joint analysis technique is proposed. However, this
requires extensive statistical analysis which is also not scalable
with complex hardware designs. The aforementioned IFT
techniques track the information flow conservatively. The label
of any operation output is assigned according to the “highest”
security label of any of its inputs, irrelevant of functionality.
While this over-approximation increases scalability for more
complex hardware, it is imprecise and results in too many false
positives.
RTL-level IFT was proposed in [4] where the IFT logic
is derived at a higher abstraction level, is faster to verify,
and the accuracy vs. scalability trade-off is configurable. In
principle, at RTL-level all logic information flows can be
tracked, and in [4] the designer is allowed to configure the
complexity (whether to track explicit and implicit information
flows) and precision of the tracking logic. Another approach
isolates timing flows from functional flows and shows how
to identify timing information leakage for arithmetic and
cryptographic units [3]. However, whether it can scale well
to effectively capture timing leakage in real-world complex
processor designs remains an open question.
At the language level, Caisson [55] and Sapper [54] are
security-aware HDLs that use a typing system where the
designer assigns security “labels” to each variable (wire or
register) by the security policies required. However, they both
require redesigning the RTL using a new hardware description
language which is not practical. SecVerilog [33, 100] over-
comes this by extending the Verilog language with a dynamic
security type system. Here, designers assign a security label
to each variable (wire or register) in the RTL Verilog code
to enable a compile-time check of hardware information flow.
However, it must use predicate analysis during simulation to
reason about the run-time behavior of the hardware state and
dependent data types for precise flow tracking.
Hardware/firmware co-verification to capture and verify
hardware/firmware interactions remains an open challenging
problem and is not available in widely used industry-standard
tools. A co-verification methodology [39] addresses the se-
mantic gap between hardware and firmware by modeling hard-
ware and firmware using instruction-level abstraction to lever-
age software verification techniques. However, this requires
modeling the hardware that interacts with firmware into an
abstraction which is semi-automatic, cumbersome, and lossy.
While research is underway [57] to analyze a limited amount
of low-level firmware running on top of a simulated RTL
design these approaches are still under development and not
yet widely available. Finally, current verification approaches
focus on register-state based information-flow analysis, e.g.,
to monitor whether sensitive locations are accessible from
unprivileged signal sources, and further research is required
to explicitly model non-register states and timing explicitly
alongside the existing capabilities of those tools.
B. Recent Attacks
As outlined in Section VIII, some recent attacks combine
different problems (e.g., inherent cache leakage and implemen-
tation errors). We explain and classify the underlying hardware
vulnerabilities (see Table II), as inferred from the technical
description of these exploits.
Yarom et al. demonstrate that software-visible side chan-
nels can exist even below cache-line granularity in their
CacheBleed [99] attack—undermining a core assumption of
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Attack Privilege Level MemoryCorruption
Information
Leakage
Cross-
modular
HW/FW-
Interaction
Cache-State
Gap
Timing-Flow
Gap HardFail
Cachebleed [99] unprivileged 7 3 7 7 7 3 3
TLBleed [34] unprivileged 7 3 3 7 3 3 3
BranchScope [31] unprivileged 7 3 7 7 3 7 3
Spectre [51] unprivileged 7 3 3 7 3 7 3
Meltdown [56] unprivileged 7 3 3 7 3 7 3
MemJam [60] supervisor 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
CLKScrew [89] supervisor 3 3 7 3 7 3 3
Foreshadow [96] supervisor 3 3 3 3 3 7 3
TABLE II: Classification of existing vulnerabilities: when reviewing recent microarchitectural attacks with respect to existing
hardware verification approaches, we observe that the underlying bugs would have been difficult to detect due to their HardFail
properties which we infer from the technical descriptions and errata of these recently published hardware vulnerabilities.
prior defenses such as scatter-gather [14]. We categorize it as
a timing-flow bug, since software can cause clock cycle differ-
ences for accesses mapping to the same bank below cache line
granularity to break (assumed) constant-time implementations.
The recent TLBleed [34] attack demonstrates that current
TLB implementations can be abused to break state-of-the-art
cache side-channel protections. As outlined in Section IV-C,
TLBs are typically highly interconnected with complex pro-
cessor modules such as the cache controller and memory
management unit, making vulnerabilities therein very hard to
detect through automated verification or manual inspection.
BranchScope [31] extracts information through the direc-
tional branch predictor. Hence, it is unaffected by software
mitigations that prevent leakage via the BTB. The authors
also propose alternative design strategies for the BTBs, such
as randomizing the patter-history table. We classify it as a
cache-state gap in branch prediction units, which is signif-
icantly challenging to detect using automated RTL security
verification techniques, since existing tools have a limited view
of non-register states. In the Meltdown attack [56], speculative
execution can be exploited on modern processors (affecting all
main vendors) to completely bypass all memory access restric-
tions. Van Bulck et al. [96] demonstrated how to apply this to
popular processor-based security extensions. Modern out-of-
order processors optimize utilization of idle execution units
on a CPU core, e.g., by speculatively scheduling pipelined
instructions ahead of time. Kocher et al. [51] show that this
can be exploited across different processes in a related attack,
as arbitrary instruction executions would continue during spec-
ulation. While these accesses are later correctly rolled-back
(i.e., they are not committed to the final instruction stream)
their effect on the caches remains visible to software in the
form of a timing side channel. This means that addresses that
are accessed illegally during speculation will be subsequently
be loaded faster, since they are cached. The authors present
end-to-end attacks, e.g., to leak arbitrary physical memory
on recent platforms, regardless of the operating system or
system configuration. We classify these vulnerabilities as hard
to detect mainly due to scalability challenges in existing tools,
since the out-of-order scheduling module is connected to many
subsystems in the CPU to optimize utilization.
MemJam [60] exploits false read-after-write dependencies
in the CPU to maliciously slow down victim accesses to
memory blocks within a cache line. Similar to Cachebleed, this
breaks any constant-time implementations that rely on cache-
line granularity, and we categorize the underlying vulnerability
as being hard to detect in existing RTL implementations due
to timing-flow gap and many cross-module connections.
CLKScrew [89] abuses low-level power-management func-
tionality that is exposed to software on many ARM-based
devices, e.g., to optimize battery life. Tang et al. demonstrated
that this can be exploited by malicious users to induce faults
and glitches dynamically at runtime in the processor. By
maliciously tweaking clock frequency and voltage parameters,
they were able to make the execution of individual instructions
fail with a high probability. The authors constructed an end-
to-end attack that works completely from software and breaks
the TrustZone isolation boundary, e.g., to access secure-world
memory from the normal world. We categorize CLKScrew
to have vulnerable hardware-firmware interactions and timing-
flow gap, since it directly exposes clock-tuning functionality
to attacker-controlled software.
X. CONCLUSION
Software security bugs and their impact have been known
for many decades now with a spectrum of established tech-
niques to detect and mitigate them. However, hardware secu-
rity bugs only became recently significant with the growing
complexity of modern processors and their effects have been
shown to be even more detrimental than that of software bugs.
Moreover, the techniques and tools to detect them are still at
their infancy. While some hardware bugs can be patched with
microcode updates, many are not. As demonstrated by our re-
sults, many hardware bugs go undetected by manual inspection
and verification techniques—even by using industry-standard
tools and crowds-sourced expertise. The security impact of
some of these bugs is further exacerbated if they are software-
exploitable.
In this paper, we have identified a non-exhaustive list of
properties that make hardware security bugs difficult to de-
tect: complex cross-module inter-dependencies, timing channel
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leakages, subtle cache states, and hardware-firmware interac-
tions. While these effects are common in modern SoC designs,
they are difficult to model, capture and verify using both man-
ual inspection and verification techniques. Our investigative
work highlights why we must treat the detection of hardware
bugs as significantly as that of software bugs. Through our
work, we urge further research to advance the state of the
art in hardware security verification. Particularly, our results
indicate the need for increased scalability, efficacy, accuracy
and automation of these tools, making them easily applicable
to large-scale industry-relevant SoC designs.
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APPENDIX
A. Ariane Core and RTL Hierarchy
We present here supporting material for the Ariane core
which we investigate in IV-C. Figure 5 shows the high-
level microarchitectural layout of the Ariane core to visualize
better its complexity. This RISC-V open-source core pales in
comparison with the complexity of a modern x86 or ARM
processor and their far more sophisticated microarchitecture
and optimization features.
Figure 6 illustrates the hierarchy of the RTL components
of the Ariane core. This focuses strictly on the core and
excludes all uncore components, such as the AXI interconnect,
peripherals, the debug module, boot ROM, and RAM.
B. Details on the Pulpissimo Bugs
In this appendix we discuss both some of our implemented
bugs and the native bugs that were already in the SoC and
discovered by some of the competition teams.
Bugs in crypto units and incorrect usage: We extended
the Soc with a faulty cryptographic hardware processing unit
which had a selection multiplexer to select between AES,
SHA1, MD5, and the temperature sensor. A hardware pro-
cessing engine operates in parallel independent of the main
processing core of the chip. The mux itself was modified so
that a race condition occurs if more than one enable bit in the
status register is enabled, causing unreliable behavior in these
security critical modules.
Furthermore, SHA-1 is an outdated cryptographic hash
function. SHA-1 has not been considered secure since 2005
and has been compromised by a number of attacks and
replaced over the years with SHA-2 and SHA-3 instead.
This type of bug is not detectable by formal verification and
requires expert specification and design decisions and manual
inspection. This is strictly a specification/design issue and not
an implementation bug, therefore it is out of the scope of
automated approaches and formal verification methods. These
are as good as the provided specification and security proper-
ties and cannot infer the intended security requirements, but
only that the implementation matches the described security
requirements.
Finally the cryptographic key used by this unit is stored
and read from unprotected memory, which allows for possible
untrustworthy access and secret key. The fact that there is
no dedicated temperature register, and instead the temperature
sensor register is muxed with the different crypto modules
which operate at a different security level is also a potential
threat. The temperature sensor register value can muxed as
output instead of the crypto engine output and vice versa, all of
which are illegal information flows, which could compromise
the cryptographic operations.
LISTING 3: Incorrect use of crypto RTL: The key input for
the AES (g_input) is connected to signal b. This signal is then
passed through various modules until it connects directly to
the L2 module.
input logic [127:0] b,
...
aes_1cc aes(
.clk(0),
.rst(1),
.g_input(b),
.e_input(a),
.o(aes_out)
);
Bugs in security modes: We have replaced the stan-
dard PULP_SECURE parameter in the riscv_cs_registers and
riscv_int_controller files with a parameter named PULP_SEC
which is always rigged at logical level "1", effectively disabling
the secure mode checks for these two modules. Another
security bug we have inserted is switching the write and read
protections for the AXI bus interface, which causes erroneous
protection checks for read and writes.
Bugs in the JTAG module: We have also implemented
a JTAG password-checker and injected a multitude of bugs
in it, including the password being hardcoded in the password
checking file itself. The password checker also only checks the
first 31 bits, which reduces the effort needed by an attacker
to brute force the password. The password checker also does
not reset the state of the correctness of the password when an
incorrect bit is detected, allowing for repeated partial checks
of passwords to end up unlocking the password checker. This
is also facilitated by the fact that the index overflows after you
hit bit 31, allowing for an infinite cycling of bit checks.
17
FIGURE 5: High-level architecture of the Ariane core [77]
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FIGURE 6: Illustration of the RTL module hierarchy of the Ariane core
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